That's the stand that Mark Kirkorian takes in this confusing post at the National Review's flagship blog. Among the vegetarian arguments that he addresses is that animal husbandry is often cruel in is methods of slaughter:
The practical reasons are invalid to buttress such a principle because none is categorical. For instance, if our modern methods of animal husbandry are cruel and inhumane and unsafe, refusing to consume meat whose provenance is unclear is a perfectly sound decision. But it's not vegetarianism, because it leaves open the possibility of buying meat at the farmer's market or straight from the farm from a man who raised and slaughtered his livestock humanely, something that's actually quite easy nowadays.
Except that this is a moral argument. To say "I will not support cruel slaughter methods" is a moral stance, even if it incomplete by more radical vegetarian positions.
I'm an omnivore, but I was once a a vegetarian years ago for the most important reason of all: to impress a girl. I had practical reasons, but if Kirkorian hasn't heard a vegetarian make moral arguments against eating meat, then he should get out of his bubble a little more.
And even if you accept his odd arguments, all he had done is prove that vegetarianism is amoral, not immoral; that is, a moral wrong.